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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY C. DEHM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs0 
YVONNE G. DEHM, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 13964 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks to terminate the payment of alimony 
to respondent and would abort any obligation on his part 
toward the support of his twin 18 year old daughters who 
are mentally retarded and incapable of self-support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 14, 1973, appellant filed a motion (R23) 
to reduce or eliminate the award of $300.00 per month order-
ed paid to respondent as alimony by the decree of divorce 
dated June 5, 1967 (R18-22). Appellant assigned the earning 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ability of respondent since the decree of divorce as being 
the sole "substantial" change of circumstance warranting 
the granting of his motion. 
Respondent filed an answer and counter-motion on 
September 21, 1973 (R25-31)0 Respondent by her answer 
makes specific reference to her work program, her school-
ing, her salary and various activities since June, 1967, 
through July 1, 1973. Respondent alleges that the decree 
of divorce and the findings of fact entered on June 5, 
1967 (Rll-22) contemplate an earning capacity on her part 
in order to augment the alimony and support provisions• 
The findings of fact entered on June 5, 1967 (No. 7, R14) 
recounts respondent's work program from the time of the 
marriage until appellant obtained his college education 
which included a Ph.D. Degree at the University of Wisconsin. 
During this period respondent worked part-time as a secre-
tary while completing her own education. She contributed 
her talents and resources to the marriage and at the time 
of the divorce was employed on a part-time basis receiving 
a gross salary of $220o00 per month (No. 5, R13). 
The twin daughters of the marriage, born August 6, 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1956, are in the care, custody and control of respondent 
by virtue of the divorce decree. By respondent1s answer 
to appellant's motion it is alleged that the children are 
not capable of adult responsibility (R28). Respondent 
asked that the support for the children be increased from 
$162.50 per month per child to $300.00 per month per child 
and that alimony be increased to $500.00 per month. She 
also asked that the insurance program be continued for an 
indefinite period, for attorney's fees and costs and that 
the decree of divorce be amended accordingly. 
There was no responsive pleading filed by appellant 
to the counter-motions. There was no denial of the allega-
tion that the children created additional burdens in their 
care and maintenance. Appellant did not urge any change 
of custody. Appellant did not ask that a general guardian 
or guardian ad litem be appointed. Appellant takes the 
position that regardless of the incapacity of the children, 
the Court in a divorce proceeding is without "jurisdiction" 
to award support beyond the chronological age of majority. 
The trial court in the instant action denied res-
pondent's claim for increase in alimony, for an increase in 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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support payments and refused to grant attorney's fees 
and court costs. In a very comprehensive memorandum deci-
sion (R58) the trial court made the following rulings: 
"1. Modify decree to provide that obligation 
of the plaintiff for support of children to 
continue indefinitely and is not to terminate 
upon children reaching chronological majority. 
2. Alimony payment to remain as is. Not 
increased or decreased. No modification. 
3. No modification as to child support. 
Plaintiff to continue taking children as tax 
deduction. 
4. Medical and hospitalization insurance 
requirement of divorce decree to be modified 
so plaintiff continues to carry same, based upon 
the apparently irreversible mental condition of 
the children, they will be dependents it appears 
into future. 
5. Plaintiff to continue life insurance with 
children as beneficiaries.0Gnot to change the 
life insurance trust to put out children as 
beneficiaries..primary beneficiaries. 
6. Each party to pay own attorney's fees. 
Defendant now has substantial job and income 
on job..able to save money and invest money. 
Court finds that there has been changes in circum-
stances of parties. 
1. Plaintiff income has increased. 
2. Plaintiff remarried but new wife 
has income. 
3. Defendant now employed and professional 
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and has substantial salary. 
4. Now appears children will always 
be dependents. Cost, time and 
trouble of caring for children has 
substantially increased due to their 
mental incapacities and disabilities. 
5. Children no longer need private 
tutoring. 
6. Children incompetent.11 
The formal order of modification was signed and en-
tered by the court on November 7, 1974 (R41-43). Among 
other things, the court in its findings of November 7, 1974, 
specifically found that the children are now and since the 
entry of the decree of divorce have been incompetent and 
will always be dependents irrespective of their chronological 
age of 18 years or older (R35). 
Appellant's motion to amend findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and decree of divorce and for a new trial 
was filed November 20, 1974, thirteen days after the court's 
formal judgment. The motion is dated November 18, 1974, 
with a mailing certificate of the same date (R45-48). Ap-
pellant's motion was heard by the trial court on December 
18, 1974 (R49). The notice of appeal is dated January 20, 
1975 (R50). 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent would have this Court affirm the rulings 
of the trial court in all respects, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant ignores the record in his statement of 
facts with reference to the incapacity of the children* 
Appellant departs from the record in attributing to respon-
dent testimony purportedly contained in Exhibit 1-P to the 
effect that she would be contented with her earnings of 
$220.00 per month claiming that her first responsibility 
was to her handicapped girls and that a sitter would not 
supply a proper emotional climate. 
Exhibit 1-P is the transcript of the testimony at 
the time of the divorce. The exhibit was not admitted in 
evidence (R33,63, 68-75). The objection to the exhibit was 
to the effect that all of the evidence adduced at the time 
of the trial of the divorce action became merged in the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce 
(R69-70). The objections and the ruling of the court in 
excluding Exhibit 1-P were in accord with the holding of 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this Court in Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 
(1972)o In that case the evidence before the court prior 
to the decree was held to be "merged in the decree, (is) 
res judicata, * * * and hence cannot be considered in 
determining the modification of the alimony award11. 
The findings made and entered by the court in June, 
1967, and referred to above do not negate the intention of 
respondent to augment her income. The necessity for res-
pondent to augment her income in order to live within the 
standard of living equated by her talents and that of her 
former husband was calculated and is obvious. 
Appellant totally ignores the testimony of Dr. 
Anthony J. LaPray, child psychologist (R76). The inade-
quacies of the children are briefly stated by Dr. LaPray 
by way of summary in Exhibit 2-D as follows: 
"In summary, both of these girls are retarded 
and will never be able to live an independent 
life. They will need constant supervision by 
their mother or another caretaker. They will 
never be able to cope with the responsibilities 
of a family or children, and will probably need 
supervision of the type given in a group home 
for the retarded, or an institution for the re-
tarded. They will never be able to handle finan-
cial or household responsibilities.11 
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Dr. LaPrayfs letter, Exhibit 2-D, dated November 
3, 1973, was used in connection with a stipulation between 
the parties and an order made by the court on the 23rd day 
of November, 1973., relating to sterilization of the children 
(R76-77). The sterilization was stipulated to as a matter 
of therapeutic necessity (R79). Dr. LaPray testified that 
the children would require specialized care throughout 
their lives (R86). 
As to the earning capacity of the children, it was 
Dr. LaPray's uncontradicted opinion that working as waitress-
es at the Granite School District Rehabilitation Center was 
a very minimal type of job, one that could only be equated 
or considered under a sheltered environment. They could 
not operate as waitresses outside of that environment. The 
children are unable to prepare their meals or take care of 
their own personal hygiene (R90)0 
The children will never be able to learn how to 
cook or to function independently and while their mental 
age has been stated generally in terms of I.Q., actually 
their I.Q. age is higher than their abilities in terms of 
vocational tasks (R91). While Dr. LaPray does not feel that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the children should be institutionalized such as American 
Fork, he does negate the concept of their becoming inde-
pendent and states as his opinion that they should not be 
removed from the custody of their mother (R95-96). 
Appellantfs salary with Hercules Powder Company is 
$2,200.00 per month (R101) as compared with his net take-
home pay per month of $1,300.00 at the time of the divorce. 
On direct examination Mr. Dehm admitted to having bonus 
payments of $3,200.00 in addition to salary for the prior 
year and that his present wife has a salary of $500.00 per 
month (R103-104)o Respondent estimated the cost of support 
at $300.00 per month per child (R129) with the cost of baby-
sitters at the rate of $15.00 per day plus board (R127). 
From the time of the divorce appellant took the 
children only one time and then for a period of five nights* 
Appellant's refusal to take the children on other occasions 
was predicated upon the proposition that his present wife 
had two adult children of her own and that she had refused 
to baby-sit her own grandchildren and was not going to act 
in that capacity with regard to Mr. Dehmfs children (R132). 
Mrs. Dehm has a comprehensive trust agreement with 
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a will in favor of the children Exhibits 7-D and 8-D 
funded by life insurance policies in the face amount of 
some $54,000.00 but with declining values and which costs 
respondent by way of premiums $1,048.00 per year (Rill). 
The burden of the children compounded by respondents 
work requirements and travel in and outside of the State of 
Utah is comprehensively outlined by her in support of the 
estimated cost of $300.00 per month per child (R127-129) 
which testimony was undisputed. Respondent's gross salary 
in her capacity with the State of Utah as Occupational Pro-
gram Consultant, Division of Alcholosm and Drugs is $946.00 
per month (R114). Mrs* Dehm has been frugal in the conserva-
tion of relatively minor assets which include the home 
allocated to her by the decree of divorce subject to a 
mortgage. Counsel overlooks the allocation to respondent 
by the decree of June 5, 1967, of an automobile, a credit 
union savings in the amount of $557.00, $1,500.00 in cash, 
a membership in the Salt Lake Swimming and Tennis Club and 
personal effects (R20). The gross amount received by res-
pondent by way of her earnings, the alimony and child support 
less respondent's financial contribution to the children do 
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not total the family cash flow of $1,500.00 per month as 
of the time of the divorce and the standard of living 
equated to the living costs at said time. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IGNORING THE CHRONOLOGICAL AGE 
OF THE CHILDREN SO FAR AS OBLIGATIONS FOR SUPPORT ARE CONCERNED. 
Appellant cites Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 330, 
172 P.2d 132 (1946), construing Section 30-3-5 Utah Code An-
notated (1953), to the effect that the statute without exception 
relates to minor children. The Anderson case was decided some 
eleven years prior to the Uniform Civil Liability Act for Sup-
port, Section 78-45-1 through 78-45-13 Utah Code Annotated, 
passed in 1957* We will refer to this Act as the Uniform 
Support Act. Section 6 of Section 78-45-6 Utah Code Annotated 
provides: 
"District court jurisdiction. - The district court 
shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought 
under this act.11 
Section 8 is as follows: 
"Section 78-45-8, Utah Code Annotated, Continuing 
jurisdiction. - The court shall retain jurisdiction 
to modify or vacate the order of support where justice 
requires. " 
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In Hyrup v. Hyrup, 70 Utah 274, 259 P. 925 (1927), 
it was held that in a divorce action it was proper to quiet 
title to property awarded to the parties. This was on the 
theory that the court merely did what was incidental and 
proper in the allocation of the property. In Larsen v. 
Paynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d 785 (1943), reference is 
made to Article 8, Section 19, Constitution of Utah to 
the effect that there shall be but one form of civil action, 
and law and equity may be administered in the same action. 
In elaboration of this principle the court stated: 
"No particular form of action or proceeding is 
either necessary or required to set in motion 
the processes of the court when the parties are 
before it and the court has jurisdiction of the 
subject matter. It is the substance and not the 
form that controls. Utah Association of Credit 
Men v. Jones, 49 Utah 519, 164 P. 1029. 
* 'k -k * 
The trial court in the divorce proceeding could 
have made or in this action may make a partition 
or division of the property and quiet title in 
the respective parts of the property and thereby 
finish the controversy. Hyrup v. Hyrup, 70 Utah 
274, 259 P. 925. 
•k * -k *k 
The court having retained jurisdiction of the sub-
-12-
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ject matter and both parties being before it, the 
task left unfinished should now upon this applica-
tion be finished.11 
Section 78-45-2 Utah Code Annotated (Uniform Support 
Act), sub-paragraph 4 in defining "child11 means one who is 
incapacitated from earning a living and is without sufficient 
means. Section 78-45-7 of the Act specifies but without 
limitation the relevant factors to be considered by the 
court in determining the amount due for support which in-
cludes the standard of living, the relative wealth and in-
come, the ability of the obligor (Mrc Dehm) to earn and 
the age of the parties. 
Page 12 of appellant's brief would have it appear 
that Section 9 of the Act gives the right of enforcement 
to the child or the State Department of Public Welfare. 
Fortunately for all concerned including the harrassed tax 
payer, the State Department of Public Welfare has not had 
to support the children and so far as an action by the child-
ren is concerned, appellant made no request for a guardian, 
being content, undoubtedly, that his former wife was a woman 
of integrity and would use the money for the support of the 
children. 
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The Court has before it the parties directly res-
ponsible and the vehicle of a divorce action is merely a 
procedureal vehicle. The district court is a court of 
general jurisdiction and the Uniform Support Act is in 
addition to the rights already afforded the district court. 
On page 7 of appellant's brief he states that the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Stanton v. Stanton, 
43 Law Ed. 2d 688 (April 15, 1975) did no more than reverse 
on constitutional grounds. We challenge this concept for 
the reason that the Supreme Court of the United States 
specifically characterized the appellant mother as fla fidu-
ciary11 on the suggestion that the support issue was moot 
in this respect. Direct reference is made to the Uniform 
Support Act. 
Last but not least is the action of the 1975 Legis-
lature in amending Section 15-2-11 Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
wherein it is now provided that minority extends to males 
and females to the age of 18. It is further provided by 
the amendment that in divorce actions the court may order 
support to 21. 
Section 78-45-12 of the Uniform Support Act to the 
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effect that the rights are in addition to those presently 
existing and not in substitution brings into focus the 
statement of the Court in Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 
436, 491 P.2d 273 (1971): 
"For the foregoing reasons decrees and orders 
in divorce proceedings are of a different and 
higher character than judgments in suits at 
law; and by their nature are better suited to 
the purpose of protecting the interests and 
welfare of children. 
* * * * 
Based upon what we have said herein it is our con-
clusion that where it appears to be in furtherance 
of the court's responsibility of safeguarding the 
welfare of children, the District Court may upon 
conditions which he deems appropriate and consis-
tent with that objective, make an order such as 
the one here under attack, staying the issuance 
of an execution. When this is done, consonant 
with the usual rule of review in equitable matters, 
his action will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
it clearly and persuasively appears that he abused 
his discretion.11 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ELIMINATE OR 
REDUCE ALIMONY. 
In the foregoing statement of facts the record is 
documented to the effect that the respondent in her present 
occupation has a gross salary of $946.00 per month as compared 
-15-
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with her gross salary of $220o00 per month on a part-time 
basis at the time of the decree of divorce in June, 1967. 
Appellant has a gross salary of $2,200.00 per month (R101) 
with Hercules Powder Company as compared with a net salary 
of $1,300.00 per month in June of 1967. Appellant's salary 
is in addition to bonus payments which amount to $3,200.00 
in 1973 (R103). By the decree of divorce appellant takes 
all tax advantages which include the children as dependents 
and alimony0 Respondent's scholastic and post graduate 
efforts are documented by her answer and counter-motions in 
the instant matter (R26-27)c Respondent's testimony is un-
contradicted to the effect that the cost incident to the 
care and maintenance of the permanetly dependent twin 
daughters is $300.00 per month each. 
Christensen v0 Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 414 
P.2d 511 (1968), a case not cited by appellant, holds that 
the wife in a relatively long marriage is not always entitled 
to alimony. Alimony is one of the factors to be considered 
with all of the other incidents of the marriage in making 
an adjustment which the court deems just and equitable between 
the parties. 
-16-
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"This is also true of the relative guilt, or 
perhaps better stated, the greater responsibility 
one spouse may appear to have than the other for 
bringing about the failure of the marriage." 
The Christensen case is quoted at some length in 
Pickens v. Pickens, 24 Utah 2d 409, 473 P.2d 397 (1970), 
a case where the marriage was endured for less than four 
months and each party was guilty of mistreatment toward 
the other and no alimony was awarded. The quotation from 
the Christensen case is as follows: 
"'Whether we as individual judges would or 
would not have arrived at the exact same formula 
as to what the most practical and just treatment 
of the economic aspects of this situation is not 
the question on this appeal. Even though it is 
the established rule that divorce cases being in 
equity, it is the duty of this court to review 
and weigh the evidence, it is equally true that 
we have invariably recognized the advantaged posi-
tion of the trial judge and given deference to 
his findings and judgment, declaring that they 
should not be upset unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them, or unless the decree 
works such an injustice that equity and good con-
science demand that it be revised * * *.'" 
Appellant cites King v. King, 27 Utah 2d 303, 495 
P.2d 823 (1972), as being "somewhat analogous" to the instant 
matter. Mrs. King appealed from the judgment modifying the 
alimony payment from $250.00 per month to $100.00 per month 
for a period of six months and thereafter to the sum of $50.00 
-17-
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per month for a period of one year and thereafter to termin-
ate. This Court affirmed the iudgment but directed the 
court below to provide for alimony in a nominal sum rather 
than its termination. 
The prior appeal in the King case, 25 Utah 2d 163, 
478 P.2d 492 (1970) was by the defendant husband, a 22 year 
old employee of Kennecott with an income of between $470.00 
and $490.00 per month. The contention was that the former 
wife at the time of the divorce was physically unable to 
work and subsequently her condition in that respect changed. 
There is no similarity to the instant case and appellant in 
so indicating goes outside of the record in his reference 
to Exhibit 1-P. 
In Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 PG2d 155 (1973), 
the trial court was reversed having reduced the former wife's 
alimony from $600000 a month to $1.00 a yearG The earnings 
of the wife at the time of the petition for modification 
amounted to approximately $7,000000 per year in the public 
health field. The husband was a physician earning a little 
over $29,000.00 per year. The former wifefs duties required 
her to travel to Hawaii, Arizona and throughout California. 
-18-
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She had burdens of consequence with her children. The 
case reviews in detail other expressions of this Court 
including the following. 
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 PG2d 
308 (1971), is cited in the Ring case to the effect that 
when neither party has appealed from the decree of divorce 
it must be assumed that the decree is a fair and equitable 
disposition of property as well as the requirements for 
alimony and support money. The Court in the Ring case 
stated the following: 
"Defendant must furthermore sustain the burden 
of proving that there has been a substantial 
change in the material circumstances of either 
one or both of the parties since the decree was 
entered. In the recent cases of Allen v. Allen 
(25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 (1970) and Short 
v. Short (25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971) 
this court affirmed the order of the trial court, 
denying modification of alimony, where at the time 
of the decree was granted, the parties contemplated 
that the wife would secure employment and contri-
bute to her own support.11 
The Ring case also comments on Felt v. Felt, supra, 
to the effect that the wife's income is not an absolute 
factor in determining whether there has been a change of 
circumstances warranting modification of alimony. This is 
closer to the present situation than anything urged by appel-
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lant. Mrc Dehm seeks to modify the decree solely upon the 
demonstrated earning capacity of his former wife since the 
decree of divorce. There is no other fact or circumstance 
leading to "manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity11 
which MrG Dehm, the moving party on the alimony issue, had 
the burden of showing. 
We do not belabor this point, there being nothing 
in the record to indicate an abitrary ruling on the part 
of the trial court and to the contrary the uncontradicted 
evidence clearly supports the retention of alimonyG 
; POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULING ON EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT 
TO APPELLANT'S EARNINGS OR THAT OF HIS PRESENT SPOUSE. 
Appellant called as a witness on his own behalf 
testified in accordance with questions propounded by MrQ 
Roe, 
l!Q. Can you tell us what your salary is at the 
present time? 
Ac Itfs $2,200o00 a month (R101). 
* * * * 
Q. Did you receive a bonus last year? 
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A. Yes. 
Q0 And how much was that? 
A. It was $3,200.00 (R103). 
* * -k Jc 
Q. Have you remarried since the divorce? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. It was in September, 1967. 
Q. Is your wife working at the present time? 
A. Yes. 
Qo Do you know what she makes in the way 
of income? 
A, Her gross is, I believe, $500.00 per 
month (R104)." 
The above matters were volunteered by appellant 
and it seems strange he would now claim error in those 
respects. 
As to the contention that the trial court erroneously 
sustained an objection to MrQ Dehm's testifying with reference 
to the condition of his home, this was a voluntary and irrele-
vant part of Mr. Dehmfs testimony offered in his case in 
chief. 
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n 
We again reiterate the fact that Mr. Dehm's petition 1 
to modify was based solely on his former wife's present earn-
ing capacityo There was no responsive pleading filed in 
connection with Mrs. Dehm's counter-motions but in any event • 
the ruling of the trial court was not conclusive or prejudicial. I 
i^ 
We point to portions of the record following the quoted 
portion as found on page 18 of appellant's brief: • 
"MR, ROE: Some of this may come in by way I 
of rebuttal. 
THE COURT: YesG It may do on that matter, I 
Mrc Roe. 
MR. ROE: And I'd just as soon leave that for I 
rebuttal, if the Court will please. 
In response to their case I may be
 fl 
anticipating just a little (R105)." I 
The condition of MrQ Dehm's home was never there- -
after pursued and we submit that the voluntary statement 
of appellant adduced by his own counsel cannot be assigned I 
as error. • 
POINT IV 
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED AND THIS APPEAL 
WAS NOT TAKEN WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE JUDG-
MENT AND ORDERS COMPLAINED OF. 
In advocating his motion for a new trial, appellant 
I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
merely reiterates his concept of no support for the child-
ren after their majority, the findings with respect to his 
own earning capacity and that of his present wife and other 
matters that we believe to be amply covered by the foregoing. 
There is one problem that goes to the "jurisdiction" 
of this Courto The amendment to the decree of divorce and 
orders pertaining thereto was dated and filed November 7, 
1974 (R41-43). Appellant's motions to amend the findings 
and for a new trial were filed November 20, 1974 (R45) with 
a certificate of mailing dated November 18, 1974 (R48)0 The 
10th day from the entry of the amendment to the decree fell 
on a Sunday and appellant had all day on Monday, the 18th of 
November to serve his motion for a new trial. The question 
is whether Rule 59 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that a motion for a new trial be filed not later than 10 
days after the entry of the judgment. 
In Vanjonora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 
1320 (1974), the Court held that the order of dismissal as 
to the defendant, Harvey Draper, made and entered on December 
21, 1972, was a final order not withstanding a motion dated 
January 4, 1973, and filed with the clerk of the court on 
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January 5, 1973. The motion was considered as a motion for 
a new trial but was held to be abortive as to Draper, not 
having been "timely filed" and therefore not tolling the 
time for appeal. 
In Watson Vo Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 
1003 (1973), there was no motion for a new trial but Rule 
59 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is specifically refer-
red to as providing "that a motion for a new trial must be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment11, 
but the opinion concludes with the language "In as much as 
there was no motion for a new trial timely filed, the time 
of appeal expired one month from July 9, 1971, and the at-
tempted appeal filed December 27, 1971, is not timely, and 
this court, therefore did not acquire jurisdiction to consi-
der the matter.", (emphasis added) 
In Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 
843 (1970), it is stated "Defendant's motion for a new trial 
was not timely filed", (emphasis added) 
We repeat that the motion for a new trial in the in-
stant matter was filed 13 days after the judgment and orders 
appealed from. If it is the filing date that controls then 
-24-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
we are not concerned with the troublesome problem as to 
whether the certificate of mailing dated November 18, 1974, 
can be equated with service of the notice within the 10 day 
period. 
CONCLUSION 
With all due respect to counsel, appellant has no 
standing of consequence before this Court and the rulings 
of the trial court should be confirmed in their entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harley W. Gustin 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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